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Abstract: This short essay, written for a symposium commemorating 
Richard Posner's twenty-fifth year as a judge, examines Judge 
Posner's majority opinion for a closely divided en banc decision on 
the federal entrapment defense. The cases considers a fundamental 
issue in the meaning of the element of ―predisposition.‖ Judge Posner 
crafts a boldly innovative reading of the Supreme Court precedent on 
the topic, introducing the element of ―position‖ or ―readiness‖ to 
predisposition. I claim the result, properly understood, is to 
rationalize the doctrine of entrapment. 
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Reforming Entrapment Doctrine in United States v 
Hollingsworth 
Richard H. McAdams† 
Whenever I teach the entrapment defense, I pair the last Supreme 
Court case on the topic—Jacobson v United States
1
—with the Seventh 
Circuit‘s en banc decision in United States v Hollingsworth.
2
 Chief Judge 
Richard A. Posner wrote the panel opinion for the 2-1 majority in 
Hollingsworth
3
 and the en banc opinion for the 6-5 majority, in each case 
holding that the two defendants were entrapped as a matter of law. Chief 
Judge Posner interpreted Jacobson—itself a 5-4 decision—as making an 
unannounced but fundamental change in entrapment law that benefited the 
Hollingsworth defendants. Under his view, the Supreme Court redefined 
―predisposition‖ to include not only the mental element of willingness to 
commit an offense, but also a positional element of being functionally able 
to do so.
4 
Posner‘s opinions display his characteristic skill in interpretation, 
creatively finding space for the doctrinal change and using that space to 
bring, to my mind, greater rationality to entrapment doctrine. There are 
lively dissents written by Judges Coffey, Easterbrook, and Ripple.
5
 Since 
the Seventh Circuit‘s en banc decision, other circuits have struggled with 
                                                                                                                      
 † Professor, University of Chicago. I wrote this contribution while still serving as the Guy 
Raymond Jones Professor at the University of Illinois College of Law and I thank my colleagues there 
for many enlightening conversations over the years on the topic of entrapment. I particularly thank 
Jacob Corré, Margareth Etienne, Andy Leipold, Steve Heyman, and Jackie Ross for comments on this 
essay. 
 1 503 US 540, 542 (1992). 
 2 27 F3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir 1994) (en banc). 
 3 9 F3d 593, 600 (7th Cir 1993). 
 4 See Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1200. The case also decides a novel question about derivative or 
vicarious entrapment that I will not discuss. See id at 1203–05. 
 5 See id at 1205–11 (Coffey dissenting, joined by Easterbrook) (arguing that the majority 
misinterprets Jacobson and erroneously reviews the factual record in the defendants‘ favor); id at 1211–
13 (Easterbrook dissenting, joined by Coffey) (criticizing the majority‘s reliance on the defendants‘ 
novice status and suggesting that prosecutors, not courts, should determine when a defendant is 
harmless); id at 1213–19 (Ripple dissenting, joined by Bauer, Coffey, and Kanne, and in part by 
Easterbrook) (rejecting the majority opinion as departing from governing precedent and creating 
substantial burdens on law enforcement officials by requiring a showing of positional predisposition).  
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the issue but rarely resolved it;
6
 one imagines that the Supreme Court will 
one day decide the point, though it has shown no great eagerness to do so. 
The entrapment defense potentially applies whenever a defendant 
commits an offense facilitated by undercover government agents. This 
occurs most typically in ―sting operations,‖ where the government agent 
plays the role of a criminal confederate (for example, a buyer of contraband 
the defendant sells), but also in ―decoy operations,‖ where the government 
agent pretends to be an attractive criminal victim (for example, an inebriate 
with cash hanging out of his pocket). Although many states have codified 
the defense,
7
 Congress has not. Instead, well before the state statutes 
existed, the Supreme Court created the entrapment defense as a matter of 
statutory interpretation. In Sorrells v United States,
8
 the Court interpreted 
federal criminal provisions not to apply to conduct in certain undercover 
operations, namely those where law enforcement officers ―instigated‖ a 
person ―otherwise innocent‖ to commit the offense.
9
 Thus, federal 
entrapment doctrine requires two elements: inducement
10
 and lack of 
predisposition. 
                                                                                                                      
 6 The Ninth Circuit did reach the issue and rejected Hollingsworth‘s positional requirement in 
United States v Thickstun, 110 F3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir 1997) (concluding that a separate positional 
requirement would be ―especially problematic in bribery cases,‖ because ―[a] person is never 
‗positionally‘ able to bribe a public official without cooperation from that official‖). A Fifth Circuit 
panel opinion following Hollingsworth was vacated en banc because the argument was not preserved for 
appeal. See United States v Knox, 112 F3d 802, 808 (5th Cir 1997) (―We recognize that the Seventh 
Circuit‘s reading of Jacobson has not been universally embraced. . . . Nonetheless, we are persuaded 
that the Seventh Circuit's Hollingsworth decision is correct.‖), vacd as United States v Brace, 145 F3d 
247, 265 (5th Cir 1998) (en banc) (―[Positional predisposition] was not presented in this case; therefore, 
mindful of our limited and proper role, we do not address it.‖). Other courts, including a more recent 
Fifth Circuit panel, have noted the issue but not decided it. See United States v Ogle, 328 F3d 182, 188–
90 (5th Cir 2003) (finding it unnecessary to address positional predisposition where attempts by the 
defendant, a sophisticated businessman, to prove he was not positioned to launder money would have 
been fruitless); United States v Squillacote, 221 F3d 542, 567 (4th Cir 2000) (declining to decide the 
issue where the defendant was unquestionably positionally predisposed to commit the crime). 
 7 See Paul Marcus, The Entrapment Defense §§ 12.01–12.26 at 705–15 (Matthew Bender 3d ed 
2002 & Supp 2006) (collecting the statutes of the twenty-six states that codify the defense).  
 8 287 US 435 (1932). 
 9 Id at 438–40, 448 (overturning a conviction for possessing and selling whiskey in violation of 
the National Prohibition Act where a prohibition agent asked the defendant three times to leave his 
house to get some whiskey, intending to prosecute the defendant for doing so). 
 10 Inducement is often defined as the government‘s doing something more than merely creating 
an opportunity for crime, as by ―persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercive tactics, 
harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship.‖ United States v 
Poehlman, 217 F3d 692, 698 (9th Cir 2000), quoting United States v Davis, 36 F3d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir 
1994). See, for example, Sherman v United States, 356 US 369, 371–73 (1958) (finding entrapment 
where a government informant faked withdrawal symptoms to induce the defendant to procure heroin to 
relieve the informant‘s suffering). Given this understanding, inducement often effectively merges with 
predisposition, a point Posner made in the panel opinion. See Hollingsworth, 9 F3d at 597 (suggesting 
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The Supreme Court has characterized predisposition as the ―principal‖ 
element in the defense,
11
 and Jacobson and Hollingsworth both turn on its 
meaning. The concept is difficult; many cases and a vast commentary have 
tried to clarify it. Hollingsworth does not concern all aspects of 
predisposition, but the case does turn on a fairly fundamental choice 
between two possibilities: (1) that predisposition means ―willingness,‖ a 
purely mental state of being willing to commit an offense at the first 
opportunity—what we might think of as the opposite of reluctance; or (2) 
that predisposition means ―tendency,‖ which requires willingness but also 
ability. In Hollingsworth, Posner adopts the second possibility: 
Predisposition . . . has positional as well as dispositional force. . . . The 
defendant must be so situated by reason of previous training or 
experience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the 
government had not induced him to commit the crime some criminal 
would have done so.
12
 
How does the choice between these definitions matter? Before moving 
to the facts of Hollingsworth, consider the following counterfeiting 
hypothetical Posner used to illustrate what is at stake in the choice: 
Suppose the government went to someone and asked him whether he 
would like to make money as a counterfeiter, and the reply was, ―Sure, 
but I don‘t know anything about counterfeiting.‖ Suppose the 
government then bought him a printer, paper, and ink, showed him 
how to make the counterfeit money, hired a staff for him, and got 
everything set up so that all he had to do was press a button to print 
                                                                                                                      
that the elements have tended to merge because the government bears the burden of showing both lack 
of inducement and presence of predisposition, and because stronger inducement makes it more difficult 
to show predisposition). If the government found it necessary to use threats, badgering, or appeals to 
sympathy to induce the crime, then the possibility that nothing less would suffice suggests that the 
defendant was not predisposed to offend. By contrast, if the one-time creation of a standard criminal 
opportunity prompted the defendant to offend, then the inference is that the defendant was predisposed.  
Nonetheless, most federal courts continue to treat the elements as distinct. In one respect, 
inducement clearly is separate from predisposition—in imposing the requirement of government action. 
There is no entrapment defense unless government agents induced the crime. No matter how unwilling 
or reluctant a defendant is, no matter what pressure is brought to bear short of duress, if those who tempt 
him are purely non-governmental actors, there is no defense. As Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1203, puts it: 
―There is no defense of private entrapment.‖ Of course, the line between governmental and non-
governmental action is not always obvious. See id at 1203–05. 
 11 Mathews[cq] v United States, 485 US 58, 62–63 (1988), quoting United States v Russell, 411 
US 423, 433 (1973) (upholding Sorrells and Sherman by declining to replace predisposition with 
inducement as the principle element in the entrapment defense).  
 12 Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1200. 
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the money; and then offered him $10,000 for some quantity of 
counterfeit bills.
13 
 
Here, there is no dispute about willingness. At the first opportunity to 
counterfeit, the defendant immediately agreed to commit the criminal act. 
He exhibited no reluctance. If predisposition means only willingness, then 
this defendant was predisposed and loses the entrapment defense. By 
contrast, the defendant was clearly not in a position to commit the crime. 
He lacked the ―training or experience or occupation or acquaintances‖ 
necessary to become a counterfeiter. Being unable without government 
assistance to commit the offense in the present and foreseeable future,
14
 he 
had no tendency to offend. Thus, if position or ability is required, he was 
not predisposed and wins the defense. 
In Hollingsworth, the crime committed was money laundering.
15
 The 
Arkansas defendants William Pickard and Arnold Hollingsworth were, 
respectively, an orthodontist and a farmer/businessman. Pickard had tried a 
variety of business ventures—movie theaters, an amusement park, an 
apartment building, and the publication of cookbooks written by his wife—
all of which had failed. He then undertook a partnership with Hollingsworth 
to become an international financier by creating a Virgin Islands 
corporation, obtaining two foreign banking licenses, and advertising for 
customers. After failing for some time to attract any customers and 
―steadily losing money,‖ Pickard placed an ad in USA Today to sell one of 
the banking licenses. The day the ad came out, a United States customs 
agent in Indianapolis, J. Thomas Rothrock, was attending a seminar on 
money laundering. Rothrock spotted the USA Today ad and called the listed 
phone number. The facts here become complex, but the bottom line is that 
Pickard demonstrated a clear willingness to commit the crime of money 
laundering, along with wariness about being detected. Over time, he took 
from Rothrock $200,000 in cash Rothrock said he obtained from smuggling 
guns to South Africa. In exchange, Pickard wired the same amount of 
money, minus his fees, to Rothrock‘s bank. Hollingsworth provided minor 
assistance. 
                                                                                                                      
 13 Id at 1199. 
 14 Position does not require an immediate ability to commit the offense. See Hollingsworth, 27 
F3d at 1202 (―We do not wish to be understood as holding that lack of present means to commit a crime 
is alone enough to establish entrapment if the government supplies the means.‖). Posner gives the 
example of someone who is willing and able to commit a smuggling offense except that he currently 
lacks a boat. Such a person lacks the present means to offend, but because boats are easy to obtain, is 
still in a position to do so. Id at 1202–03 (―[I]f the government had not supplied [the means] someone 
else very well might have.‖). 
 15 See id at 1200–02. 
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Posner conceded that, on these facts, if predisposition means merely 
willingness, then Pickard and Hollingsworth were appropriately convicted. 
They were clearly willing. But after holding that predisposition also 
includes a positional aspect, Posner concluded that Pickard and 
Hollingsworth were, as a matter of law, not in a position to commit the 
offense: ―Pickard and Hollingsworth had no prayer of becoming money 
launderers without the government‘s aid.‖
16
 They were therefore entitled to 
an acquittal. 
Posner defended this conclusion, first, by describing the obstacles the 
defendants faced: ―[T]o get into the international money-laundering 
business you need underworld contacts, financial acumen or assets, access 
to foreign banks or bankers, or other assets. Pickard and Hollingsworth had 
none.‖
17
 Indeed, their Virgin Islands corporation had no up-and-running 
bank and their crude scheme to launder money—by taking cash and wiring 
money to Rothrock‘s bank—did not make any use of their corporation or 
foreign bank licenses.
18
 Laundering money is a difficult task, given that the 
government devotes great resources to keeping track of money. Criminals 
who seek to launder cash will therefore only hire those who appear to have 
the skill to prevent government officials from penetrating the scheme. 
Given their lack of experience, expertise, and institutional assets, Posner 
concluded, ―[n]o real criminal would do business with such tyros‖ as 
Pickard and Hollingsworth.
19
 ―Whatever it takes to become an international 
money launderer, they did not have it.‖
20
 Or at least the government made 
no effort to prove otherwise.
21
 
Given these obstacles, Posner described what would have occurred if 
Agent Rothrock had never begun his sting operation: 
[Pickard and Hollingsworth‘s] solicitations for financial business had 
produced a tiny investor, but no customers. Their corporation was 
running out of money when they placed the ad in USA Today for the 
Grenadan banking license. No one responded to the ad, except 
[Rothrock]. . . . Had [Rothrock] not answered the ad, Pickard would 
soon have folded his financial venture. 
                                                                                                                      
 16 Id at 1202. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id at 1203. 
 20 Id at 1202. 
 21 Id at 1203 (―[P]erhaps the government could have shown that a Grenadan banking license has 
no other use but money laundering and that sooner or later Pickard and Hollingsworth would have 
gotten into money laundering even without the government's aid. No attempt was made to show this.‖). 
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. . .  
Our two would-be international financiers were at the end of their 
tether, making it highly unlikely that if [Rothrock] had not 
providentially appeared someone else would have guided them into 
money laundering.
22
 
In sum, however willing to offend the defendants were, had the 
government left them alone, it was not ―even remotely likely‖
 23
 that they 
would have committed the crime. 
The dissenters did not entirely agree with this assessment,
25
 but their 
main point was not factual but legal: that the settled law of predisposition 
required nothing more than a willingness to offend. If so, then all agree that 
Pickard and Hollingsworth lose. We can divide the legal debate between 
Posner and the dissenters into two topics. First, does Supreme Court 
precedent permit Posner‘s positional requirement? Second, is the positional 
requirement good policy? 
Both topics are wonderful opportunities for teaching. Most casebooks 
teach entrapment with Jacobson, the Supreme Court‘s last entrapment case. 
Posner conceded that, before Jacobson, the courts of appeals were ―drifting 
toward‖ the view that predisposition meant pure willingness.
26
 He claimed, 
however, that Jacobson compels a different understanding. Thus, the first 
topic comes down to the meaning of Jacobson. Reading Hollingsworth 
forces the students to think deeper about the meaning of Jacobson, and 
                                                                                                                      
 22 Id at 1202–03. 
 23 Id at 1202. 
 25 In particular, Judge Coffey objected to the description of Pickard as innocent in Posner‘s 
―otherwise innocent‖ formulation, discussed below. Id at 1206–09 (Coffey dissenting). Judge Coffey 
catalogues the evidence of Pickard‘s general guilt: he arguably encouraged Rothrock to structure his 
banking deposits illegally; he said he used a ―tap light‖ to reveal if anyone was monitoring his phone; 
and when arrested, he was carrying false passports issued to the mythical ―Dominion of Melchizedek.‖ 
Yet all this evidence demonstrates merely that Pickard was willing to commit an act he believed to be 
criminal. That he is ―otherwise innocent,‖ (emphasis added) however, means only that he would not 
offend outside the operation, which could be true despite his willingness if he lacks the position or 
ability to offend. No evidence suggests that Pickard would ever have been hired by criminals to launder 
money. Ultimately, Judge Coffey does not claim that Pickard was positioned to offend but objects to the 
requirement of position. 
 26 Id at 1198 (majority). Posner describes the pre-Jacobson view as follows: 
[T]he defense of entrapment must fail in any case in which the defendant is ―willing,‖ in the sense 
of being psychologically prepared, to commit the crime for which he is being prosecuted, even if it 
is plain that he would not have engaged in criminal activity unless inveigled or assisted by the 
government. 
Id. 
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possibly to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the interpretation 
of precedent. 
In Jacobson, federal undercover agents spent over two years 
corresponding with the defendant about his sexual interests and ―rights‖ 
before offering to sell him sexually explicit photographs of minors.
27
 
Jacobson, a Nebraskan farmer, had on a previous occasion purchased Bare 
Boys I and Bare Boys II, which contained nude photographs of preteen and 
teenage boys, though the material was legal at the time he purchased it. 
Soon after Congress changed the relevant law by enacting the Child 
Protection Act of 1984,
28
 federal officials discovered Jacobson‘s prior 
purchase and began exchanging letters with him. Postal inspectors and 
customs officials posed as members of five fictitious organizations (for 
example, the American Hedonist Society) and a ―bogus pen pal,‖ Carl 
Long. In these guises, they asked Jacobson about his sexual interests and 
advocated the right of access to sexually explicit images of minors. After 
twenty-six months of such correspondence, one fictitious organization, the 
―Far East Trading Company Ltd.,‖ offered to sell Jacobson a sexually 
explicit magazine involving young boys. Jacobson placed an order and 
federal officials arrested him after a controlled delivery of the magazine to 
his house, where subsequent searches discovered no other pornography. A 
jury convicted Jacobson of violating the Child Protection Act of 1984.  
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed.
29
 Again, the issue was 
whether there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that Jacobson 
was predisposed and thus reject his entrapment defense. Writing for the 
majority, Justice White held that the government failed to meet its burden of 
proving predisposition, finding its evidence insufficient as a matter of law. 
First, the pre-1984 order of child pornography did not prove predisposition 
because the act was at the time lawful. ―Evidence of predisposition to do 
what once was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show predisposition to 
do what is now illegal.‖
30
 Second, Jacobson‘s ―ready response‖ to the 
solicitation did not prove he was predisposed at the requisite time. Given an 
inducement, ―the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being 
approached by Government agents.‖
31
 Yet his willingness to offend after 
                                                                                                                      
 27 See Jacobson, 503 US at 542–48 (reporting the facts described in this paragraph).  
 28 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub L 98-292, 98 Stat 204, codified as amended at 18 USC § 
2252(a)(2) (2000 & Supp 2003) (criminalizing, among other things, the receipt via interstate commerce 
of images of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct). 
 29 Jacobson, 503 US at 554. 
 30 Id at 551. 
 31 Id at 549 & n 2 (emphasis added). 
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―26 months of repeated mailings and communications,‖
32
 while sufficient to 
prove predisposition at that time, was insufficient to prove ―that this 
predisposition was independent and not the product of the attention that the 
Government had directed at‖ Jacobson.
33 
 
The dissent worried that this focus on the timing of predisposition 
might make the government‘s burden too difficult.
34
 In response, Justice 
White noted: ―Had the agents in this case simply offered [Jacobson] the 
opportunity to order child pornography through the mails, and [Jacobson]—
who must be presumed to know the law—had promptly availed himself of 
this criminal opportunity, it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would 
have warranted a jury instruction.‖
35
 But the federal authorities here had 
done much more than simply offer their target the opportunity to offend. In 
so doing, they created the risk of causing an ―innocent‖ person to offend. 
Near the end of his opinion, Justice White concluded: ―When the 
Government‘s quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an 
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would 
have never run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene.‖
36
 
What does Jacobson say about the legal issue addressed in 
Hollingsworth? Does the case compel or at least permit Posner‘s conclusion 
that predisposition has a positional element? Jacobson said nothing directly 
about these issues and gave no explicit indication that it was breaking new 
ground. Judge Easterbook, dissenting in Hollingworth, argued in favor of 
―treat[ing] the Justices as honest expositors‖ who would not change the rule 
significantly without saying so.
37
 But Posner noted that ―it is not unusual for 
a court to change the law without emphasizing its departures from or 
reinterpretation of precedent; emphasis on continuity is characteristic of 
common law lawmaking even when innovative.‖
38
 Posner then seized on 
                                                                                                                      
 32 Id at 550. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id at 557–58 (O‘Connor dissenting, joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy, and in part by 
Scalia) (fearing that lower courts and criminal investigators would misread the majority‘s rule to require 
evidence of predisposition before beginning a criminal investigation). 
 35 Id at 550 (majority). 
 36 Id at 553–54. 
 37 Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1212 (Easterbrook dissenting). 
 38 Id at 1198 (majority). Judge Easterbrook pointedly responds:  
A relatively formal treatment of the Supreme Court‘s opinions better promotes evenhanded 
administration of justice than does a willingness to infer change from opinions reiterating old 
rules. After all, what six judges of this court see in Jacobson, five others think a mirage. As we 
approach a thousand judges on the federal courts, such differences in visual acuity have the 
potential to transmute Norman Rockwell‘s view of the world into Joan Miró‘s  
Id at 1212 (Easterbrook dissenting). 
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the last sentence I quoted above from Jacobson: that the courts should 
intervene when the government induces an offense from ―an otherwise law-
abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run 
afoul of the law.‖
39
 Posner‘s point is that a citizen can be ―otherwise law-
abiding‖ and unlikely ever to offend not only because he is unwilling to 
offend but also because he is unable. The counterfeiting hypothetical makes 
this point: a person who does not know how to counterfeit money is 
unlikely ever to commit the crime despite being willing to do so. Posner 
said the same of Jacobson: ―A farmer in Nebraska, his access to child 
pornography was limited‖
40
 and, indeed, the search of his house found no 
evidence of any other such offenses.
 
Thus, the quoted language and the 
outcome of the case imply that predisposition has a positional component. 
The dissenting opinions point to different language in Jacobson. First, 
there is the holding that the prosecution must prove that the defendant was 
predisposed before the government first begins its inducement.
41
 Thus, one 
can read Jacobson as embracing predisposition as pure willingness but 
reversing the conviction only because the government failed to prove that 
the willingness existed at the requisite time, before the government 
approached Jacobson. On this reading, the Supreme Court did not mention 
the importance of position (or ability) to predisposition because it did not 
mean to introduce the concept into the law. To the contrary, there is Justice 
White‘s statement that there would likely be no grounds even to instruct the 
jury on entrapment ―[h]ad the agents . . . simply offered [Jacobson] the 
opportunity to order child pornography through the mails, and [he] . . . had 
promptly‖ accepted.
42
 If so, then Jacobson‘s ―position‖—a Nebraskan 
farmer with limited access to child pornography—seems irrelevant. 
The dissenters make a fair point. It seems difficult to read Jacobson as 
permitting the rule Posner adopted, much less as compelling it. On Posner‘s 
behalf, however, one might reply that the ―otherwise innocent‖ notion that 
Justice White expressed is not a casual rephrasing of the law but an idea 
deeply embedded in entrapment doctrine. Although Posner noted that the 
key Jacobson language he relied on ―is not found in previous opinions,‖
43
 
there is something similar in Sorrells, the Supreme Court‘s first entrapment 
                                                                                                                      
 39 Jacobson, 503 US at 553–54 (emphasis added).   
 40 Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1199. 
 41 See id at 1211 (Coffey dissenting), quoting Jacobson, 503 US at 550) (―[A]lthough he had 
become predisposed to break the law by May 1987, … the Government did not prove that this 
predisposition was … not the product of the attention that the Government had directed at petitioner 
since January 1985.‖). 
 42 Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1206 (Coffey dissenting), quoting Jacobson, 503 US at 550. 
 43 Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1199. 
11 
 
case. The Sorrells Court held that Congress did not intend that its criminal 
statutes would permit the police to ―instigat[e] . . . an act on the part of 
persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to 
punish them.‖
44
  
It is difficult to read ―innocent‖ here to refer to conventional 
innocence, given that the kind of defendants we are discussing have all 
committed the actus reus of an offense with the requisite mens rea. Usually, 
they also believe that they are committing crimes.
45
 Thus, even before the 
Supreme Court decided Jacobson, Jonathan Carlson read this passage of 
Sorrells, as I do, to refer to the ―core idea[] . . . that it is improper to impose 
criminal sanctions upon a person who would not have engaged in criminal 
conduct absent an effort by the government to induce such conduct.‖
46
 If so, 
then Sorrells‘s ―otherwise innocent‖ term arguably means, as in Jacobson, 
―an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely 
would have never run afoul of the law.‖
47
 So, even though the Court has 
never before used Justice White‘s phrasing, the idea it expresses arguably 
predates the Jacobson opinion and is central to predisposition, not an 
unintentional implication of an imprecise restatement.
48
 That does not mean 
that the Supreme Court precedent has ever required a positional element to 
predisposition, but that it has never addressed the question and its concept 
of entrapment plausibly entails the requirement. 
Now let‘s move from the doctrinal question to the policy one. 
Whatever the meaning of Jacobson, Posner was right (at least from a 
consequentialist standpoint) to think that entrapment doctrine should care 
whether someone is in a position to offend. To fully resolve the policy 
debate might require asking about the underlying purpose of the entrapment 
defense and choosing among the competing normative theories.
49
 
                                                                                                                      
 44 Sorrells, 287 US at 448 (emphasis added). 
 45 See Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J Crim L & Criminol[cq] 
107, 121–22 (2005) (noting the difficulty in distinguishing, on grounds of blameworthiness, cases where 
a defendant was entrapped by a government agent and cases where a defendant succumbed to the same 
inducement provided by a private individual). 
 46 Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense, 73 
Va L Rev 1011, 1051 (1987). 
 47 Jacobson, 503 US at 553–54. 
 48 As Posner conceded, the weakness of this argument is that the courts of appeals were, before 
Jacobson, reaching a consensus that predisposition meant pure willingness. Rather than argue that these 
Courts had misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent, Posner argued instead that Jacobson changed 
everything. See Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1198 (―[Predisposition] is suggestive of pure willingness . . . . 
But the suggestion cannot in our view be squared with Jacobson.‖).  
 49 This is a complex question that many long articles address. See the literature cited in 
McAdams, 96 J Crim L & Criminol at 119–49 (cited in note 45) (critiquing existing entrapment theory). 
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Fortunately, I believe we can see the wisdom in Posner‘s approach without 
fully agreeing on the ultimate rationale of the entrapment defense. 
Whatever it is, the defense distinguishes between two types of defendants: 
(1) those ―otherwise innocent‖ or ―otherwise law-abiding‖ individuals who 
would not likely offend but for government inducement, and (2) those 
otherwise non-law-abiding citizens who, outside undercover operations, 
likely would run afoul of the law (by committing the same type of offense). 
When the undercover operation ensnares a citizen from the second 
category, who likely offends outside undercover operations, the police have 
apprehended precisely the kind of individual whom we need to deter and 
incapacitate. As Posner put it, ―[a] person who is likely to commit a 
particular type of crime without being induced to do so by government 
agents, although he would not have committed it when he did but for that 
inducement, is a menace to society and a proper target for law 
enforcement.‖
50
 By contrast, a person from the first category poses no threat 
to society because, if the police leave him alone, he will not offend. There is 
much more one could say about linking the categories to the ultimate 
rationale for the defense,
51
 but I will take for granted, as many discussions 
of entrapment do, that the defense is founded on this distinction. 
Indeed, the dissenters do not really argue against this basic idea; none 
explicitly says that it is desirable to punish individuals who are unlikely 
ever to offend outside of undercover operations. Instead, their argument is 
that it is difficult to make the distinction except purely as a matter of 
willingness. They worry that positional predisposition will be too hard for 
the prosecutor to prove.
52
 I address this point below, but we should initially 
consider why the concern for whether a person will otherwise offend led 
Posner to care about whether the defendant is in a position to offend. 
If we are to distinguish between those who are and are not likely 
otherwise to offend, then Posner is surely right that the doctrine should 
consider any reason that a person is not likely to offend. Economic theory 
has a lot to say about how to distinguish between the two classes of 
                                                                                                                      
 50 Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1203. 
 51 See generally McAdams, 96 J Crim L & Criminol 107 (cited in note 45), in which I tie the 
distinction to two rationales: (1) the need to temper a principal/agent problem that otherwise causes 
police to use undercover operations to generate a high number of low value arrests, and (2) the need to 
provide limits on the power of government officials to target political enemies and unpopular 
scapegoats. I advocate, however, that the distinction be implemented by defining predisposition in a way 
that will usually exonerate only the ―otherwise innocent,‖ and not to attempt in each case to determine 
whether the defendant is otherwise innocent.  
 52 See Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1218 (Ripple dissenting) (―This holding adds a whole new 
dimension to the arsenal of the mainstream drug trafficker and the traditional racketeer.‖) 
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individuals. A person‘s risk of offending is a combination of his preferences 
and opportunities. Some people have unusually good opportunities to 
offend but will not take them because of their preferences; other people 
have preferences unusually favorable towards crime but will not act on 
them because they lack the opportunity. If we want to use entrapment 
doctrine to exculpate these objectively harmless people, then we should 
define predisposition to exclude from punishment those who are 
sufficiently unlikely to offend because of either their preferences or 
opportunities. This means granting a defense to those who are generally 
unwilling to offend even given good opportunities and also to those who 
are unable to offend despite their willingness. Of course, most people are 
able to commit most crimes; willingness is the central issue because those 
who are willing to offend usually will. But on ―rare‖
53
 occasions, position 
will also matter.  
To be more precise, consider the analysis of predisposition offered by 
Ron Allen, Melissa Luttrell, and Anne Kreeger (Allen, et al).
54
 Most 
undercover operations target offenses involving illegal market transactions, 
such as the purchase and sale of narcotics, automatic weapons, sexual 
services, and official favors. Allen, et al therefore suggest a ―market test‖ 
for the entrapment defense—that the government be allowed to offer no 
greater an inducement than the price offered in the actual criminal market.
55
 
The intuition behind this seems strong—the people whom we need to deter 
and/or incapacitate are those who will offend given existing and probable 
levels of inducement. The Allen, et al approach suggests why simple 
willingness should not always be sufficient to nullify the entrapment 
defense. A person might be willing to offend when first tempted only 
because the offer is vastly better than any that would ever materialize in the 
real world. That someone would sell drugs at ten times the market level 
does not prove they would sell drugs at the market level. 
Allen, et al make an important breakthrough, but did not go far enough 
in defining what the market test should mean in practice.
56
 To identify 
individuals otherwise likely to offend, one cannot merely ask if the 
government limited its inducement to a market price, even if ―price‖ 
includes all variables affecting the attractiveness of the offer. One should 
                                                                                                                      
 53 Id at 1200 (majority). 
 54 Ronald J. Allen, Melissa Luttrell, and Anne Kreeger, Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J Crim L & 
Criminol[cq] 407, 413–14 (1999) (arguing that entrapment analysis should shift from predisposition to 
market value, as everyone, excepting saints, has a price at which they will commit crimes). 
 55 Id at 414–20 (arguing that the market test will serve the three main functions of punishment: 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation). 
 56 See the similar discussion in McAdams, 96 J Crim L & Criminol at 178 (cited in note 45). 
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also ask whether, in the market, a particular person would be able to obtain 
the market price (as a buyer or seller). In many or most black markets, this 
additional question is unnecessary because anyone who is willing to 
participate is able to participate, at least at some level. In a thick market, as 
that for illegal drugs, it is relatively easy to locate sellers of at least modest 
quantities of the contraband, and anyone who can buy can in turn sell. The 
same is generally true of services, given that solicitation itself is usually a 
crime. Anyone willing to solicit sex for money can do so. Among those 
willing to offer a bribe, only the truly destitute are incapable. 
By contrast, there are certain black markets in which the willingness to 
participate is not sufficient because there are substantial barriers to 
participation. One example is when access is limited. One cannot sell 
contraband that one cannot obtain—for example, a stolen military 
submarine. But most examples involve services because services often 
involve special knowledge or skill that many people cannot provide. For 
example, in the counterfeiting hypothetical Posner described, the 
undercover target has no knowledge of counterfeiting. At oral argument, the 
prosecution conceded that it would be a strong case for entrapment if 
undercover agents offer to set up such a novice with the machines and 
personnel necessary to counterfeit currency and offer to pay him 
handsomely for pressing the right button.
57
 The concession is necessary 
because it is so obvious that no one would pay the market price for 
counterfeiting services to someone who lacks the relevant knowledge or 
skill. And no one would pay that market price for a service anyone could 
perform, such as pushing a button. Thus, the fact that one is willing to 
accept such an implausible offer does not prove that one would otherwise 
offend. 
Within the broad category of black market crimes where participation 
depends on ability as well as willingness, there is a special subset where 
ability is particularly important. For these crimes, the buyer values quality 
not just for the normal reasons—to satisfy his preferences—but also to 
avoid detection. Consider arson for hire. Suppose a building owner seeks to 
hire an arsonist to burn his building in order to collect on the fire insurance. 
If the arsonist does a bad job, then the owner‘s problem is not that the 
building does not burn down, but that the scheme is detected and he goes to 
prison. Bad arson is far worse than no arson. For this reason, whatever the 
market price is for arson, it is not likely to be offered to those who have no 
relevant skill, knowledge, or experience in making an intentional fire 
                                                                                                                      
 57 Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1199. 
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appear to be accidental. If the government offers the market price for a 
skilled arsonist to someone with no such experience, then there is a great 
risk that the government will induce an individual to offend who would 
never otherwise do so.
58
 
Posner made the same point about Pickard and Hollingsworth. Again, 
the whole point of money laundering is to prevent the government from 
tracing money. Hiring someone who does a poor job of laundering money is 
worse than hiring no one at all; worse than not being able to spend one‘s 
cash is not being able to spend one‘s cash because one is in prison. So if the 
police offer the market price to one with no relevant experience, 
knowledge, or contacts, they create a serious risk of inducing a crime by 
one who would never otherwise offend. 
Now we come to the dissenters‘ concern. They believed that the 
concern for position will be easily exploited by clever criminal defendants 
and make undercover operations far less effective.
59
 This fear is misplaced. 
The dissent seems to ignore Posner‘s assurance that the positional element 
does not depend solely on whether the defendant has the ―present means‖ to 
commit the crime, but whether he is likely at some point to acquire the 
means.
60
 As explained above, for most crimes that undercover operations 
target, the defendant is in a position to commit the crime. One obvious 
piece of proof is that most courts of appeals have never had to decide 
whether to follow or reject Jacobson because so few willing defendants can 
plausibly assert that they lacked the position to commit the crime. This is no 
surprise. The most common undercover operation induces the sale of an 
illegal drug. Yet where the defendant delivers the right goods, he cannot 
                                                                                                                      
 58 Of course, the inexperienced arsonist is also more likely to be apprehended than the skilled 
arsonist, which gives him some reason to decline the offer. But even if the arson is detected, the 
probability that the police will apprehend the arsonist may be low—he commits the crime in private and 
has the option of immediately fleeing the jurisdiction. The poor or homeless especially may think the 
risk is worth it, even though they would never be offered the market price by an actual building owner.  
 59 See Hollingsworth at 1217 (Ripple dissenting) (―[The positional requirement] will provide 
first-rate arrest insurance for the occasional drug trafficker who, willing to ply his trade whenever the 
opportunity presents itself, is still not quite sufficiently organized when the opportunity is provided by 
the undercover agent.‖).[39 words] The Ninth Circuit raised a similar concern in rejecting 
Hollingsworth. See note 6.  
 60 Id at 1202–03 (majority). The central issue for Posner is whether the defendant, ―if left to his 
own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law.‖ Jacobson, 503 US at 553–54 (emphasis 
added). Thus, there is no defense for the ―person who is likely to commit a particular type of crime 
without being induced to do so by government agents, although he would not have committed it when 
he did but for that inducement.‖ Hollingsworth, 27 F3d at 1203. Posner illustrates this by noting that it 
would not be entrapment for the government to supply a defendant with a boat necessary to commit the 
offense, because an actor presently lacking only a boat to complete his criminal scheme is likely 
eventually to offend without government aid. Id at 1202–03.  See also note 14. 
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tenably assert that he lacked the position to commit the trafficking offense. 
For illegal services, perhaps the most common crime targeted in undercover 
operations is the acceptance of a bribe. Yet in bribery stings the police target 
only those individuals, usually government officials, who possess the 
discretionary authority that gives them the position to be bribed.
61
  
In the end, Posner‘s decision made a narrow change in the law of 
entrapment, yet one that seems to make the defense more rational. We quite 
plausibly want to prevent conviction of those who are unlikely otherwise to 
offend. If so, then we will usually determine that fact by examining the 
defendant‘s willingness to offend. But in some special cases, such as 
Hollingsworth, we will also have to examine their ability to offend.  
Notwithstanding my defense of Hollingsworth, for teaching purposes, 
I like to test its basis and scope by asking about its application in other 
contexts. Consider Hemant Lakhani, who agreed to sell missiles and a 
launcher to an FBI agent he believed was a terrorist intending to shoot 
down American passenger planes.
62
 The problem for the FBI was that 
Lakhani had no access to these weapons, though they gave him almost a 
year to find them. Lakhani also resembles Pickard in that he had lived a 
long time (69 years) without incurring a criminal record and seemed to have 
many get-rich-quick schemes that did not pan out (for example, to the 
undercover FBI agent, he also proposed to sell diamonds, scrap metal, and 
mangoes, the last to sell to Mexican immigrants). Ultimately, the FBI had 
Russian undercover operatives sell Lakhani a (nonfunctional) launcher so 
he could make the promised sale, which he did (though when he received 
the launcher from the Russians, Lakhani appeared to test it by placing it on 
his shoulder pointing backwards). Should he be entitled to the entrapment 
defense as a matter of law because he was not in a position to commit this 
                                                                                                                      
 61 The basis for concern that Judge Ripple expressed in his dissent, see note 59, is obscure. If the 
occasional drug trafficker‘s disorganization prevents him from selling drugs when asked by an 
undercover agent, then there will likely be no conviction regardless of what the entrapment rule is. 
There appears to be no undercover offense. But if the trafficker does sell drugs, then he demonstrates his 
ability to do so regardless of how disorganized he is. Thickstun‘s concern, see note 6, is also misplaced. 
That opinion worries that a bribe maker would lack the position to offend unless the government proves 
that a genuine bribe taker  would cooperate. But Posner would clearly allow the conviction of Pickard if 
he merely had the knowledge, experience, or institutional contacts to become a money launderer, 
without the additional proof of particular criminals with whom he would transact. Thus, Posner assumes 
that one who is willing and able to do his part in a crime is sufficiently likely to find a criminal partner 
that his punishment is justified. To be in position to make a bribe, all one needs is money. 
 62 See Petra Bartosiewicz, I.O.U. One Terrorist: Rounding Up “Al Qaeda,” One Stooge at a Time, 
Harper‘s 48, 48–49 (Aug 2005) (using the Lakhani story to criticize the Bush administration‘s terror-
prevention policies); Petra Bartosiewicz, The Arms Trader, This American Life (Chicago Public Radio 
Jul 8, 2005), audio online at http://www.thislife.org/ (visited April 29, 2007) (discussing Lakhani‘s case 
in the context of the challenges of post-September 11 terrorism prevention).  
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crime?
63
 The irony here is that Posner favors controversial government 
powers to fight terrorism,
64
 yet his positional element might provide 
Lakhani with a defense. I have argued elsewhere that the ideal entrapment 
defense would be tailored to the particular class of crime, rather than the 
one-size-fits-all defense we now have.
65
 Thus, if actors like Lakhani deserve 
no defense, this would not mean that one has to reject the positional 
element for all crimes. One could plausibly distinguish between violent and 
nonviolent crimes, finding that position is required to convict a defendant 
who willingly commits a nonviolent offense in an undercover operation, but 
not required for one who willingly commits a violent offense in such an 
operation, given the danger that violence poses. Under the existing 
approach, however, this tailoring is unavailable, leaving the same rules for 
Pickard and Lakhani. 
In any event, Posner‘s view may offer a more satisfying explanation of 
the result in Jacobson. Justice White had to strain to explain why the 
evidence in Jacobson was, despite a jury verdict, legally insufficient to 
show that Jacobson was predisposed. Courts have generally required little 
evidence to prove predisposition. Admittedly, the evidence of Jacobson‘s 
willingness to purchase child pornography would have been stronger if 
Jacobson‘s past purchase had at the time been illegal. But most Nebraska 
farmers (like most citizens) probably do not know the legal significance of 
the Child Protection Act of 1984, so it is likely that Jacobson either (a) did 
not know his earlier purchase of child pornography was legal or (b) did not 
know his contemporary purchase of child pornography was illegal. If he 
thought his prior conduct was a crime, it is evidence of his willingness to 
offend. Also, if he thought his contemporary conduct was not a crime 
(which is no defense), then the prior purchase is evidence of his willingness 
to commit acts that are in fact a crime. The only way that the prior purchase 
has no probative value, as Justice White suggests, is if (c) Jacobson knew at 
the earlier time that the purchase was legal and knew at the later time of the 
sting operation that the purchase was illegal. There seems to be no reason to 
                                                                                                                      
 63 In fact, Lakhani was convicted and sentenced to forty-seven years in prison. See John Sullivan, 
British Businessman Sentenced in Terror Case, NY Times B6 (Sep 13, 2005). 
 64 See generally Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National 
Emergency (Oxford 2006). See also id at 147 (urging that constitutional rights should reflect a pragmatic 
balance between ―competing constitutional values, such as personal liberty and public safety‖). 
 65 See McAdams, 96 J Crim L & Criminol at 168–73 (cited in note 45) (suggesting that the 
defense should vary with, among other things, the severity of the crime charged, the effectiveness of 
ordinary reactive law enforcement for that crime, the elasticity of demand for the crime, the proportion 
of such crimes committed by recidivists, and, for black market crimes, the thickness of the criminal 
market). 
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deny to the jury the power to make inferences about Jacobson‘s knowledge 
of the law, which includes the right to reject (c) as implausible. 
Then there is the fact that, as soon as the government agents offered to 
sell Jacobson child pornography, he placed an order.
66
 Admittedly, the 
evidence would have been better for the prosecution if Jacobson had placed 
the order without having first received twenty-six months of 
correspondence advocating his right to do so. But note that Jacobson never 
once said no. One could understand throwing out the jury verdict if the 
evidence showed that for each of the first twenty-five of those twenty-six 
months Jacobson had refused to order child pornography the government 
had offered. Even a few refusals would be powerful evidence of 
unwillingness. But here we have no offers until the end of the twenty-six 
months, so there is no evidence of reluctance. Eventual willingness is some 
evidence of initial willingness. In the end, one can see why four justices 
thought the prior purchase plus the present absence of reluctance was 
sufficient evidence of predisposition.  
By contrast, if predisposition includes a positional element, one can 
add to Justice White‘s analysis the fact that Jacobson was not in a position 
where he was likely to be tempted to offend, being a farmer in a rural 
state.
67
 One could say that the evidence was sufficient to show his 
willingness, but given that federal agents found no child pornography in 
Jacobson‘s home other than what they sent him, he apparently lacked the 
position to offend. (Unlike other forms of contraband, a person who has 
such material is very likely to have it at their home, especially when they 
work from their home.) Admittedly, the positional issue remains a close one 
given that Jacobson had once purchased such material by mail when it was 
legal. But a legal purchase is arguably very weak evidence that one can find 
access when the good is illegal because sellers will be far fewer and less 
visible. 
Given Posner‘s interpretation, Jacobson may obviously be broader 
than it first seems because it recognizes a positional element to 
predisposition. But it is also narrower because, under his interpretation, 
Jacobson does not necessarily make willingness harder to prove. To 
illustrate, assume the facts are the same as Jacobson except that the 
                                                                                                                      
 66 Actually, near the end of the investigation, Jacobson was twice offered the opportunity to buy 
child pornography and placed an order each time, though the first order was never sent. See Jacobson, 
503 US at 546–47. 
 67 Jacobson does not say whether Jacobson had internet access at home, which could obviously 
change the analysis (though it seems unlikely that a rural farmer in the 1980s would have had internet 
access). 
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defendant is clearly in the position to buy illegal child pornography—he is 
an urban dweller who lives across the street from an adult book store that is 
shown to have sold such material and to advertise via handbills the sort of 
claims the government used in Jacobson. Thus, even if the government‘s 
search of this hypothetical defendant‘s home discovers no pornography 
other than what the government provided, we know that he could easily 
find access to the material. Given Posner‘s positional analysis, one could 
distinguish this hypothetical case from Jacobson by saying that, while there 
is sufficient evidence in both cases that the defendant is willing, only in the 
hypothetical is the defendant clearly also in the position to offend. Given 
that he is now likely otherwise to offend, the proper result is to sustain the 
conviction. Under the Hollingsworth dissenters‘ view of Jacobson, 
however, these new facts change nothing. Their view is that Jacobson turns 
entirely on insufficient evidence of willingness. That the hypothetical 
defendant is well positioned to offend would not change the analysis, under 
which the government‘s twenty-six-month letter-writing effort compels an 
acquittal.  
*          *          * 
The issue in Hollingsworth had probably never really been answered 
in either direction by the Supreme Court because it has probably never been 
recognized as a separate question. By seeing the issue, Chief Judge Posner 
created the opportunity to reform entrapment doctrine to further the ends it 
serves—to distinguish the otherwise law-abiding from the otherwise 
criminal. The best defense of the opinion involves some basic economic 
concepts, such as the distinction between preferences and opportunities and 
the observation that, in markets where quality matters sufficiently, those 
who lack the ability to supply high-quality goods or services will lack the 
opportunity to sell. It is probably no coincidence that Posner‘s opinion did 
not explicitly discuss economic concepts, but strategically grounded the 
decision more in precedent than theory. The opinion illustrates not only 
Posner‘s interpretive skills but his leadership, in that he manages to 
persuade just enough fellow judges to embrace an approach of great 
novelty. Whenever the Supreme Court does address the issue, the justices 
would do well to read his opinion carefully. 
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